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Abstract
The behaviours of citizens during bushfires may
determine whether they live or die. Using 100 citizen
witness statements from the 2009 Australian bushfires,
we show how people react to bushfire smoke. Eightynine witnesses expressly mention smoke, not
necessarily in combination with fire. This prompted
behaviours including: seeking further information,
monitoring the situation, effecting a fire plan
(including evacuation), alerting people to danger and
fire risk, and going home. Computational simulators
have been used to assess civilians’ risk and to help
with evacuation efforts. Despite works that accurately
model fire spread and people’s behaviours in response
to perceiving fire, the issue of how people react to
seeing smoke from a bushfire is rarely considered. We
discuss how the identified behaviours may be
incorporated into an agent-based simulator of
bushfire.

1. Introduction
The recent Australian bushfires in 2019/2020
were the worst on record, with 46 million acres of
forest and farmland burned, more than one billion
animals killed, thousands of buildings, including
homes, destroyed, and at least 34 lives lost [1] [2]. In
the early 1990s, the state of Victoria in Australia
adopted the bushfire response policy for civilians to
‘prepare, stay and defend’ or ‘prepare and leave early’;
known colloquially as the ‘Stay or Go’ policy [3].
However, since the 2009 bushfires the guidelines have
been updated and people are now encouraged to leave
before the bushfire threatens [4]. In a recent study,
Whittaker reported that since the 2009 bushfires the
percentage of householders that planned to leave when
threatened by a bushfire had risen from 24% to 2665% [5]. This puts increasing pressure to manage
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evacuation of the population in a safe and speedy
manner.
Evacuation poses a huge problem for emergency
managers since they need to ensure that there are a
sufficient number of routes out of the danger zone, and
that they are safe from fallen trees and embers. In
addition, the potentially large number of evacuees
means that road congestion can soon become a
problem. Therefore, controlled evacuation, with
certain zones being evacuated before others, may be
practiced. Evacuation relies on the public knowing of
the danger and being ready to evacuate. Hence, it is
important to carefully schedule warning, alerts, and
evacuation messages and to make sure that they are
accurate [6] [7].
Large scale evacuation exercises are difficult,
costly and often impractical to organise. Therefore,
computer simulation of evacuation has become a
useful tool. Such simulators often employ a
geographical information system (GIS) to model the
distribution of households in the environment as well
as the transport network. Other components, such as
the fuel load of the environment (trees, shrubland,
clear areas, etc.) are also included. An important
component of the simulator is the fire model. One of
the first considerations is the area that the fire model
covers, from small scale such as a few buildings, to
larger scale models covering hundreds of kilometers.
In this work, we are only concerned with the latter.
Many fire models can predict the rate of fire spread
and its direction. Meteorological information, such as
wind speed and direction, and differences in
vegetation and terrain, are also often included [8] [9]
[10] [11] [12] [13]. Smoke generation from the fire is
accounted for and complex smoke models exist that
can be incorporated into fire models [14]. Despite
these impressive works, the effect of smoke on citizens
and in particular how people behave in the face of
smoke has received less attention. We argue that
smoke, even in the absence of fire, is a trigger for some
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human behaviours and that these should be
incorporated into computational models of evacuation.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2
covers related work on how human behaviours
regarding smoke are modelled in evacuation
simulators. Section 3 describes our study method,
whilst section 4 describes the results of our analysis.
The implications of the results for developing bushfire
evacuation simulators are discussed in section 5.
Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of the
main findings and a description of future work.

2. Previous work
Early works on evacuation modelling mainly used
a macro approach employing mathematical equations
to simulate the demand load on roads and calculate the
average origin-to-destination times [15] [16]. The
problem with such macro models is that they track
masses as a whole and make unrealistic assumptions
regarding individuals’ behaviours [17]. To overcome
this an agent-based micro simulation approach has
become popular. An agent is a computational entity
capable of autonomous behaviour. It is able to take
information from its environment, make its own
decisions and act accordingly. The use of agents in
modelling human systems has several advantages over
other approaches [18]. Firstly, agent-based systems
are able to capture emergent phenomena, such as
traffic jams. Secondly, they provide a natural
description of a system, which as Bonabeau notes
makes the approach much closer to reality. Finally,
they are flexible, allowing us to study social systems
at different levels of abstraction by varying the
complexity of our agents or by aggregating agents into
subgroups.
In agent-based evacuation simulators, the agents
represent people, groups of people, or more typically
vehicles. There are now many evacuation simulators
for different types of emergencies and disasters that
use an agent-based approach. Some works (for
example [19], or [20]) place their efforts on accurately
modelling the fire component using an agent-based
approach, whilst ignoring the human element. Other
works concentrate on emergency response operations
to fighting the fire by modelling command and control
behaviours of rescue personnel and their decisionmaking process [21]. There have been some works that
focus on the behaviour of citizens in the community
during a bushfire. Investigating how people’s
behaviours were affected by cognitive biases during

bushfires, Arnaud developed an algorithmic
formulation of how biases may be implemented in an
agent-based simulator [22]. Mancheva and her
colleagues,
modelled
the
behaviours
and
communications of response personnel and citizens
during an Australian bushfire [23]. Although citizens
can perceive the fire and take protective actions, such
as putting on protective clothing, checking their
property for embers, and evacuating to a shelter, there
are no actions linked to perceiving smoke. Likewise,
Singh and Padgham developed an agent-based model
for community evacuations with a realistic approach
that uses residents’ beliefs, goals, and plans to drive
agents’ behaviours [24]. In the simulation, residents
are ordered to leave the area and drive to designated
relief centres. Human behaviour in the model is based
on real life, with some agents taking a while before
acting on the evacuation order, and some driving to
collect loved ones or picking up children from school.
Nevertheless, the evacuation is triggered by an
Incident Controller who runs the simulation; it does
not take into account the mounting road congestion
that may occur from people who decide to evacuate
beforehand due to seeing the warning signs of smoke.
Although many simulators accurately model how
agents react to fire, by either sensing it in their
perception range, or being informed of the fire danger
from official communications, the models do not
include any behaviours related to smoke.

3. Method
The work used as its basis the 100 lay witness
statements1 that are included in Volume 4 of the 2009
Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission final report
[25]. The statements were freely available on-line as
separate files from the Bushfire Cooperative Research
Centre until 2016.
The transcripts vary in length from half a page to
several pages. The transcripts were searched using the
search string ‘smo’ to find references to smoke, as well
as words such as ‘smoky’ and ‘smoldering’. Of the
100 statements, 11 do not mention smoke or any of the
associated words (see section 4.1 for a characterisation
of those interviewees). We thus excluded these 11
transcripts in looking for behaviours in the face of
smoke.
The actions following the sight or smell of smoke,
or as a consequence of it being present, were then
noted. Actions that were undertaken when fire or
embers were also present were not noted since the

1
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action could not be considered as a direct result of just
the smoke. Of the 89 transcripts, a total of 672
sentences mentioned the word smoke or its associates.
Figure 1 gives the number of mentions of smoke per
transcript, which shows that, as would be expected,
smoke is a prominent aspect of the threat of, and
response to, bushfires.

Number of sentences regarding smoke
per transcript

75

Yes

10

Yes

98

Yes

99

Yes

Number of sentences

35
30
25
20
15
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21

Yes

69

Yes

71

Yes

5
0

1

11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81
Transcript reference number

Figure 1. Number of sentences regarding
smoke per transcript.

4. Results
4.1. Characterisation
mentioning smoke

of

people

not

Of the 100 statements, 89 people explicitly
mention smoke, only 11 people do not mention smoke
in their statements (Table 1).
Tranc.
ref. no.

Involved Present in
in fire?
professional
(Yes/No) capacity

0

No

6

No

27

No

33

No

Comments

Lost many family
members. Statement
made to highlight
support and services to
bereaved families for
the Royal Commission.
Brother died in the
fire.
Lost partner who died
while defending his
property.
Lost son, wife and 2
grandchildren who died

while trying to
evacuate.
Nurse who worked in
a makeshift medical
facility (tent) to help
victims.
CFA volunteer who
helped to fight the fire.
Lost aunt and uncle.
Cousin’s property was
totally destroyed.
Statement given as an
expert on horticulture
and agriculture
regarding risk
reduction.
Statement given as an
expert concerning
community and fire
safety issues.
Planned to defend, was
well equipped, and had
a fire plan. However,
he had never
experienced a bushfire
and evacuated as was
overwhelmed by fire.
The transcript does not
detail his experience
during the fire.
House successfully
defended, but the
stables (occupation:
horse breeder) and
other buildings were
destroyed, 10 horses
died.
Lost wife and son
while evacuating. Wife
and son returned home
in a separate car and
perished.

In summary, of the 11 people who did not mention
‘smoke’ in their statements, 4 were not directly
involved in the fire, but had lost close family members;
4 were involved from a professional point of view
(fire-fighter, nurse, vegetation specialist, community
resilience worker). Only 3 of the 11, shown by the grey
cells in table 1, were directly involved in the fire. The
above table shows that smoke is strong environmental
cue and, as we will see in the next section, it evokes
specific behaviours.

4.2. Most common behaviours associated
with smoke
4.2.1. Seek information. Many people reported
that they were actively listening to the radio or
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regularly checking bushfire information websites
throughout the danger period. However, the sight or
smell of smoke often provoked an action to seek
information, whether this was turning on the radio or
calling friends, neighbours or relatives. 24 of the 89
transcripts (27%) mentioned that smoke prompted
them to search for information. In terms of the most
popular sources of information, many turned to the
County Fire Authority, CFA, websites (13 references
to this source) or the radio (8 references to this source)
when they saw smoke. Others either phoned their
neighbours, friends, family, the local police station,
the bushfire hotline, or consulted the Bureau of
Meteorology website.
Although many people turned to the radio or
official websites for information, there are many
criticisms concerning the lack of, or timeliness of
information. This meant that some citizens relied on
smoke to give them more accurate information:
“During the day I was listening to the radio but
from what I could see of the smoke around the valley
the updates on the radio were always behind.” (Ref
transcript 23)
What may seem strange to us now is the lack of
reference in the transcripts to any social media as a
source of information. Social media, and in particular
Twitter, has been used for many years for citizens to
develop awareness of the unfolding situation [26] [27],
coordinate support efforts [28], and provide and
receive information from emergency management
authorities [29], both during and after the disaster [30].
There is evidence that social media was used as a
source of information on bushfires by newspapers [31]
and radio stations. This includes ABC Radio
Melbourne, the main radio station in the state where
the fires were burning [32]. However, the low uptake
of Twitter in the years leading up to and including
2009 could explain its limited use. In their study
Sinnappan and her colleagues found only 1684 tweets
from 705 unique users as the bushfire events unfolded
between the 6th and the 14th February, 2009 [32].
4.2.2. Monitor the situation. Smoke not only
alerted people to danger, but was used to monitor the
ongoing situation. From the 89 transcripts, 56 (63%)
describe an activity that can be interpreted as using
smoke to monitor the situation. Examples from the
transcripts that show this are as follows:
“I went in and out of the house all day checking
for any signs of fire, particularly smoke.” (Ref
transcript 2).
“By watching the smoke, which was clearly visible
from my home, I kept close tabs on where the fire was
burning and it was growing each day.” (Ref transcript
11).

“We continued to monitor the smoke.” (Ref
transcript 40).
“On such days our routine is to observe the
countryside from various viewpoints, look up to the
mountains, monitor where the wind is blowing from
and just watch out for smoke.” (Ref transcript 74).
It was clear from the transcripts that citizens as
well as the CFA were frequently using the sighting of
smoke to indicate the location of the fire. As a CFA
officer notes:
“We were reliant on visual observations of the
smoke plume for our information of the passage of the
fire and on telephone calls to the observers at the
Kangaroo Ground Tower, who said they had limited
visibility due to the smoke.” (Ref transcript 40).
What is also interesting is that people frequently
commented on the form or colour of the smoke and it
was clear that this was used as an indicator of the
location of the fire, or how the fire was progressing.
Out of the 89 transcripts 49 (55%) mentioned the
colour, density or form of the smoke.
“I went back outside to check it again and I saw
that the smoke had become thicker. Again, the smoke
was still not within breathing distance, but it was no
more than one kilometre away.” (Ref transcript 2).
“I observed that the smoke column was
continually growing and getting darker in colour – a
sure sign that the fire was hot.” (Ref transcript 40).
“At that point we looked up and saw a big black
cloud of smoke coming, which was different to what
we had seen coming over from Kilmore.” (Ref
transcript 23).
A small minority of people, 4 out of the 89, said
that upon seeing the smoke they moved to a position
by car to get a better look. Sometimes this was to
monitor the situation more closely, and sometimes this
was just out of curiosity.
4.2.3. Effect fire plan (Evacuate or Prepare and
Defend). In 2009 Australian state and territory fire
authorities advised citizens either to ‘stay and defend’
or ‘leave early’. To practically implement this policy,
the CFA of Victoria advised citizens to prepare a fire
plan in advance of the fire season and that the plan
should be written down and well-practised. For the
2009 bushfires, half the population that responded to a
survey said that they intended to stay and defend,
while only 21% intended to leave, 26% people tended
to adopt a wait and see approach [5].
Perhaps one of the most obvious behaviours
prompted by seeing or smelling smoke in the
transcripts was to instigate a fire plan. Seeing both
smoke and fire is a clear indicator that there is danger.
However, if we consider those respondents who
reacted to smoke alone, 23 of the 89 respondents
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(26%) were prompted to implement their fire plan.
However, several points should be taken into account.
The first is that people had often been monitoring the
fire-risk situation for several hours, in some cases
days, via news outlets and websites. This meant that
they were already alert to the danger and the possible
risks. The second is how long it took people to start
implementing their plan upon the first sighting of
smoke.
Some
respondents
clearly
reacted
immediately:
“As soon as we saw smoke, we prepared the fire
pump and got out our other smaller pieces of
equipment such as mops, buckets and our fire box.”
(Ref transcript 48).
Whilst others monitored the smoke and waited
until it came closer or changed in density or colour. In
the following excerpt smoke was noticed at 3.30pm,
but the respondents waited one and a half hour before
starting the garden sprinklers, and only got the large
fire hose out two and a half hours after the first
sighting and when the smoke became dense and fastmoving:
“At around 3.30 pm, I noticed smoke from a big
fire far to the South-West, approximately 30-40 km
away….The smoke was a huge mushroom cloud, it
looked like a nuclear bomb had just gone off but it was
a long way away. By 5.00 pm however, it seemed
closer so we decided to start soaking the sides of the
house using the garden sprinklers…By 6.00 pm there
were heavy fast-moving rolling palls of smoke in the
sky so I laid out the big fire hose.” (Ref transcript 77).
Some of the respondents had a plan to evacuate
immediately, while others waited to see what would
happen. 10 respondents evacuated in response to
seeing smoke, with no sightings of fire. Some
evacuated immediately, for example:
“I could not hear anything but I could smell the
smoke. It was about 6:20pm when we drove out of our
driveway with our two dogs and headed into
Traralgon.” (Ref transcript 17).
Others were obviously caught out and had waited
too long before evacuation. Although, there was still
no sightings of fire, the smoke in itself had become
dangerous and promoted evacuation, for example:
“I couldn't see any flames at that stage but the
smoke and embers were so thick that it was obvious
that the fire had hit the surrounding bush.” (Ref
transcript 79).
As we see from the above example, the decision
to evacuate was not just prompted by smoke but also
by seeing embers and often the sound of the fire. For
those that evacuated late, what is clear from the
descriptions in the transcripts is that visibility during
evacuation was greatly affected. Many respondents
reported that the sky was black and that they had

problems seeing. This undoubtedly affected the speed
of evacuation.
“He said both sides of the road were burning and
the smoke was so thick that he couldn't see past the
bonnet of his car and burning branches were hitting
his car and that he was full of fear.” (Ref transcript
12).
“The smoke was like really thick fog. It was
difficult to read the road signs and people were
panicking, with cars heading in different directions”
(Ref transcript 4).
4.2.4. Alerting people to danger and to the fire
risk. On seeing or smelling smoke the majority of
people were alerted to danger, as the following
examples show:
“Even though the smoke was coming from
Kilmore, we realized it was a threat to our property.”
(Ref transcript 61).
“Late in the afternoon, I went out into our
backyard and I noticed some grey-white smoke off in
the distance […..]. My immediate thought was that
Marion would need to stay inside and I cautioned her
to do so.” (Ref transcript 2).
This warning to the fire risk did not necessarily
come from seeing smoke alone but was often in
association with other factors, such as earlier news
broadcasts or the prolonged extremely hot weather.
Nevertheless, 14 people (16%) did not consider
that smoke indicated a danger or was an immediate
precursor to fire. This was either due to previous
experience where smoke had been seen in the past but
there was no immediate danger of fire, or because
people thought that it was a controlled burning
exercise. The following comments show these points:
“I wasn't panicking at all at this stage because I
had smelt smoke during a previous fire that burned
near Malmsbury and that fire never got anywhere near
us.” (Ref transcript 96).
“Even when I saw that smoke I was concerned but
not alarmed – we had seen smoke in the sky in previous
years from various distant fires.” (Ref transcript 87).
“Although there was some smoke in the air, I
thought it was a burn off.” (Ref transcript 49).
4.2.5. Go home. Since the 7th February was a
Saturday, the majority of respondents were at home
when the bushfires occurred. Some people however
were at work, shopping, or out visiting friends, etc.
Upon seeing the smoke 9 of the 89 respondents (10%)
decided to go home as the examples below show:
“I told her I was going to go home because I was
a bit worried about the smoke that I could see in the
distance.” (Ref transcript 52)
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“I immediately went home and at about 3.45pm, I
took a photo from my veranda of the horizon obscured
by smoke.” (Ref transcript 82)
It should be noted that the majority of these people
had a fire plan that involved defending their home.

5. Implications for modelling and
simulation
Although the above activities can be taken into
account in models of human behaviours in bushfire
events, it is first important to consider to what level
human behaviours should be modelled. That is,
whether human activities should be modelled at a
finely grained level, such as individual
communications when searching for information, or at
a coarser grain, such as general evacuation. Low level
behaviours, such as searching for information, calling
friends and family, etc. can have a significant impact
on evacuation time if we consider the cumulative time
taken for these activities [33]. A clear assumption in
human behaviour models of bushfire evacuation is that
upon receiving an evacuation order, people will
immediately start to evacuate. From the transcripts,
this is clearly not the case. People perform a plethora
of activities (collecting belongings and pets,
telephoning others, packing the car, etc.) before they
evacuate. The time taken for these pre-evacuation
behaviours is rarely taken into account in fire
evacuation simulators. Although it can be hard to
gauge how long people spend on average performing
these activities, some work has been done in the area.
Based on field studies and a literature search, Bangate
identified, modelled and simulated 37 individual preevacuation human behaviours, each with timing
intervals, in the case of earthquakes [33]. The duration
of these activities was used to estimate the delay
before actual evacuation occurred.
Evacuation models also assume perfect visibility
during evacuation. From the preponderance of
transcripts that describe the difficulty of people to see
others, objects, signs, etc. due to the smoke, it is
evident that evacuation speed is greatly reduced when
high density smoke is present. A consequence of this
for simulation is to reduce the travel speed depending
on the density of the smoke as predicted by smoke
models. Although there have been studies that look at
how individuals walking speeds are affected by smoke
during evacuation, e.g. [34], there are few works that
look at how people drive in smoke-filled areas.
Driving in smoke has been liked to driving in fog and
indeed the two are often treated equally in transport
studies [35]. In order to incorporate the effect of smoke
on driving, it is necessary to assess how speed varies

according to smoke and then to calibrate the vehicle
speed in the simulator. In a simulated experiment Yan
and his colleagues looked at how driver speed was
affected by different densities of fog (no fog, light, and
heavy) and gave speeds for each density for various
types of road [36]. A study that looks specifically at
car driving behaviour in smoke during evacuation in a
bushfire was undertaken by Wetterberg. By employing
virtual reality, he asked participants to drive in an ad
hoc wildfire evacuation scenario. From his results a
regression model, which related the speed with the
smoke density, was developed [37]. Given that both
of the above studies use virtual reality, it cannot be
assumed that the drivers experience the same risk
perception and levels of stress as they would have in
real life. Nevertheless, these works do give us a
starting point in calibrating car speed in the face of
smoke.
Although increasing numbers of people intend to
evacuate, many will stay to defend their homes and
livelihoods, or return to elderly or dependent relatives.
After the 2009 bushfires, the fire danger ratings that
are available to the public to show the fire risk in their
area were revised. Two new categories were
introduced by the New South Wales government:
severe and catastrophic [38]. The highest category,
catastrophic, advises that for survival, leaving is the
only option. Despite this, a recent study found that
even now 10 to 34% still plan to stay and defend [5].
If these people are away from their homes then they
will return and start their defense fire plan. In terms of
modelling and simulation, we cannot assume that all
citizens will necessarily evacuate and that, taking a
conservative figure, 10% will try to return to their
homes. Some will be stopped by road blocks but others
will attempt to bypass them and use unofficial
backroads to get home [39].
There is clear evidence that people use smoke as:
an alert to danger, to seek further information, to
monitor the situation, to trigger a fire plan, or to go
home. However, there are some people (16% in the
transcripts) who will not react to sightings of smoke.
With the predicted increase in extreme bushfires due
to climate change estimated to rise by 30% by 2017
[40] fires will become more common and people may
become increasingly complacent in their response to
seeing smoke. This may be exacerbated by the
increase in prescribed controlled burning, which has
risen since 2004 [41]. Although we may think that an
increase in the number of bushfires may increase
people’s awareness of bushfire risk and so result in
them being more responsive to sightings of smoke, this
is not necessarily the case. Indeed, even after the
bushfires of 2009, people still have a limited
awareness of bushfire risk [5] and there is no clear

Page 2231

relationship between increased risk perception and
taking action [42]. This would imply that a percentage
of the population will continue not to react to smoke.
In terms of modelling and simulation this means that a
percentage of the people modelled cannot be assumed
to take actions when faced with smoke. From the
transcripts, this was 16%.

6. Conclusion
The number and severity of bushfires is estimated
to increase in the coming years due to climate change.
Effective evacuation therefore becomes a critical
issue, which has been aided by computer simulations
that can assess different strategies and policies. It is
now recognised that human behaviours must be taken
into account in such situations. However, how people
react to bushfire smoke is rarely included in such
simulations. Using empirical evidence, we have
shown how smoke is an important factor that can
trigger peoples behaviours. Six main behaviours were
identified: seeking further information, monitoring the
situation, effecting a fire plan (including evacuation),
alerting people to danger and fire risk, and going
home. We argue that in order to be more realistic,
future computer simulation should take into account
not only the perception of the fire, warnings, and
evacuation order, but how people react to seeing or
smelling smoke.
The work has several limitations. Firstly, as
qualitative research, the analysis of the transcripts was
subjective. Although the authors have been working
for many years in the areas of bushfires and qualitative
research, the analysis may still be influenced by their
personal perspectives. Secondly, the analysis concerns
the fires that occurred on the 7th February 2009 in the
state of Victoria. Although this was Australia’s worst
bushfire disaster in terms of lives lost, these fires are
not the most recent, nor the most wide-spread.
Unfortunately, an analysis of the most recent fires in
2019/2020 is still being conducted by the authorities
and so no official reports are available. This meant that
we had to base our work on the 2009 bushfires.
Finally, the analysis only included what was actually
written in the statements. Some people may have done
certain actions, such as using smoke as a trigger for
monitoring how the fire was evolving, but did not
explicitly mention it in their statements.
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